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Abstract
A recent technique of randomized smoothing has shown that the worst-case (adversarial) `2-robustness can be
transformed into the average-case Gaussian-robustness by “smoothing” a classifier, i.e., by considering the
averaged prediction over Gaussian noise. In this paradigm, one should rethink the notion of adversarial
robustness in terms of generalization ability of a classifier under noisy observations. We found that the
trade-off between accuracy and certified robustness of smoothed classifiers can be greatly controlled by
simply regularizing the prediction consistency over noise. This relationship allows us to design a robust
training objective without approximating a non-existing smoothed classifier, e.g., via soft smoothing.
Our experiments under various deep neural network architectures and datasets demonstrate that the
“certified” `2-robustness can be dramatically improved with the proposed regularization, even achieving
better or comparable results to the state-of-the-art approaches with significantly less training costs and
hyperparameters.
1 Introduction
Despite achieving even super-human level performance on i.i.d. datasets [He et al., 2016; Silver et al., 2017;
Devlin et al., 2019], deep neural network (DNN) classifiers usually make substantially fragile predictions than
humans on the samples not from the data-generating distribution. The broad existence of adversarial examples
[Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015] are arguably the most crucial instance of this phenomenon: a
small, adversarially-crafted perturbation on input can easily change the prediction of a classifier, even when
the perturbation does not affect the semantic information perceived by humans at all.
This intriguing weakness of DNNs has encouraged many researchers to develop robust neural networks,
along with a parallel attempt to break them with stronger attacks [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a; Uesato et al.,
2018; Athalye et al., 2018]. Currently, the community has agreed that adversarial training [Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Madry et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019], i.e., augmenting the training dataset with adversarial examples,
is an effective defense method, but the “scalability” of the method is often questionable in several aspects:
(a) it is generally hard to guarantee that an adversarially-trained classifier is indeed robust, (b) generalizing
the robustness beyond the training threat model is still challenging [Tramèr and Boneh, 2019; Kang et al.,
2019], and (c) the network capacity required for robust representation seems to be much larger than practice,
e.g., a recent observation shows empirical robustness does not saturate even at ResNet-638 on ImageNet
dataset [Xie and Yuille, 2020].
Alternatively, a growing body of the research has developed methods that can provide certified robustness
[Sinha et al., 2018; Wong and Kolter, 2018; Zhang et al., 2020]. Randomized smoothing [Lecuyer et al., 2019;
Cohen et al., 2019] is a recent idea in this direction, which shows that any classifier (e.g., a neural network)
that performs well under Gaussian noise can be “smoothed” into a certifiably robust classifier. This opens a
new, scalable notion of adversarial robustness: a neural network may not have to be perfectly smooth, as a
proxy of another classifier.
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However, it has been relatively under-explored that how to train a good base classifier to maximize the
certified robustness of the smoothed counterpart, e.g., Cohen et al. [2019] only explored the standard training
with Gaussian augmentation. A few recent works [Salman et al., 2019; Zhai et al., 2020] have shown that
a more sophisticated training algorithm can indeed improve the certified robustness, but the common
downside is that they require a sensitive choice of many hyperparameters to optimally trade-off between
accuracy and robustness, often imposing a significant amount of additional training costs.
Contribution. In this paper, we show that a simple consistency regularization term added on a standard
training scheme surprisingly improves the certified robustness of smoothed classifiers. Maintaining the
prediction consistency over a certain noise, e.g., Gaussian, can be regarded as a natural and desirable
property for a classifier under noisy observations. Indeed, for example, forcing such consistency is now
considered as one of the most popular techniques in the semi-supervised learning literature [Sajjadi et al.,
2016; Miyato et al., 2018; Oliver et al., 2018; Berthelot et al., 2019]. We examine this regularization, motivated
by the observation that perfect consistency is a sufficient condition for minimizing the robust 0-1 loss of
smoothed classifiers. This observation connects certified robustness of smoothed classifiers to the general
corruption robustness [Hendrycks and Dietterich, 2019; Gilmer et al., 2019], supporting a great potential of
smoothed inference as a scalable alternative of adversarially-trained, deterministic classifiers.
We verify the effectiveness of our proposed regularization based on extensive evaluation covering MNIST
[LeCun et al., 1998], CIFAR-10 [Krizhevsky, 2009], and ImageNet [Russakovsky et al., 2015] classification
datasets. We show that our simple technique upon a naïve training achieves a very comparable, or even
better, certified `2-robustness to other recent, robust training methods [Li et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019;
Zhai et al., 2020]. For example, one of our models for CIFAR-10 shows a better robustness than those trained
by other tested methods with 2.7× faster training due to its simplicity. Furthermore, we also demonstrate
that applying our method upon a more sophisticated training even further improves the certified robustness,
e.g., our method applied upon state-of-the-art training could further improve the average certified `2-radius
0.785→ 0.799 on CIFAR-10.
Despite its effectiveness, our proposed regularization is easy-to-use with only a single additional hyperparam-
eter, and could run significantly faster than existing approaches without additional backward computation
as in adversarial training. We observe that our method does not introduce instability in training for a wide
range of the hyperparameter, offering a new, stable trade-off term between accuracy and certified robustness
of smoothed classifiers. Finally, our concept of regularizing prediction consistency can be extended to other
families of noise other than Gaussian, which are often corresponded to different types of adversary, e.g.,
Laplace noise for `1-robustness [Lecuyer et al., 2019; Dvijotham et al., 2020].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Adversarial robustness
We consider a classification task with K classes from a dataset D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1, where x ∈ Rd and
y ∈ Y := {1, · · · , K} denote an input and the corresponding class label, respectively. Usually, D is assumed
to be i.i.d. samples from a data-generating distribution P. Let f : Rd → Y be a classifier. In many cases,
e.g., neural networks, this mapping is modeled by f (x) := arg maxk∈Y F(x) with a differentiable mapping
F : Rd → ∆K−1 for a gradient-based optimization, where ∆K−1 denotes the probability simplex in RK.
In the literature of general robustness research [Dodge and Karam, 2017; Biggio and Roli, 2018; Hendrycks
and Dietterich, 2019], f is required to perform well not only on P, but also on a certain extension of it without
changing the semantics, say P˜. In particular, the notion of adversarial robustness considers the worst-case
distribution near P under a certain distance metric. More concretely, a common way to define the adversarial
robustness is to consider the average minimum-distance of adversarial perturbation [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2016; Carlini and Wagner, 2017b; Carlini et al., 2019], namely:
R( f ; P) := E(x,y)∼P
[
min
f (x′) 6=y
||x′ − x||2
]
. (1)
2
Therefore, our goal is to train f that (a) performs well on P, while (b) maximizing R( f ; P) as well.
2.2 Randomized smoothing
In practice, the inner minimization objective in (1) is usually not easy to optimize exactly, and mostly results
in near-zero value on standard neural network classifiers. The key idea of randomized smoothing [Cohen
et al., 2019] is rather to consider the robustness of a “smoothed” transformation of the base classifier f over
Gaussian noise, namely fˆ :
fˆ (x) := arg max
k∈Y
Eδ∼N (0,σ2 I)
[
1 f (x+δ)=k
]
, (2)
where σ2 is a hyperparameter that controls the level of smoothing. For a given input x, Cohen et al. [2019]
guarantees a certified radius in `2 distance, the current state-of-the-art lower bound of the minimum-distance
of adversarial perturbation around fˆ (x): suppose f (x + δ) returns a class fˆ (x) ∈ Y with probability p(1)
and the “runner-up” (i.e., the second best) class with probability p(2) := maxc 6= fˆ (x) P( f (x + δ) = c). Then,
the lower bound can be given as follows:
R( fˆ ; x, y) := min
fˆ (x′) 6=y
||x′ − x||2 ≥ σ2
(
Φ−1(p(1))−Φ−1(p(2))
)
(3)
provided that fˆ (x) = y, otherwise R( fˆ ; x, y) := 0. Here, Φ denotes the standard Gaussian CDF. Since the
inequality holds for any upper bound of p(2), say p(2), one could also obtain a bit loose, but simpler bound
of certified radius by letting p(2) = 1− p(1) ≥ p(2):
R( fˆ ; x, y) ≥ σ ·Φ−1(p(1)) =: R( fˆ , x, y). (4)
3 Consistency regularization for smoothed classifiers
Our intuition on the proposed consistency regularization is based on minimizing the 0-1 robust classification
loss, in a similar manner to the recent attempts of decomposing the training objective with respect to
the accuracy and robustness [Zhang et al., 2019; Zhai et al., 2020]. Specifically, we attempt minimize the
following:
E(x,y)∈D
[
1− 1R( fˆ ;x,y)≥ε
]
= E
[
1 fˆ (x) 6=y
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
natural error
+E
[
1 fˆ (x)=y, R( fˆ ;x,y)<ε
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
robust error
, (5)
where R is the certified lower bound of R as defined in (4), and ε > 0 is a pre-defined constant. Assuming that
the natural error term can be optimized via a standard surrogate loss, e.g., cross-entropy, we rather focus on
how to minimize the robust error term. Here, the key difficulties to consider a gradient-based optimization
is that (a) computing fˆ exactly is intractable, and more importantly, (b) fˆ is practically a non-differentiable
object when estimated via Monte Carlo sampling (see (2)), so that even a proper surrogate loss function
would not make the optimization differentiable.
To bypass these issues, we instead concentrate on a sufficient condition to minimize the given robust 0-1 loss.
Recall that we assume f (x) = arg maxk∈Y F(x) for a differentiable function F : Rd → ∆K−1. Intuitively, we
notice that the robust loss would anyway become zero if F(x + δ) returns a “constant” output over δ for a
given x. More concretely, the condition implies Pδ( f (x + δ) = fˆ (x)) to become 1 regardless of what fˆ is, and
minimizes an upper bound of the robust loss in (5) due to the following:
E
[
1 fˆ (x)=y, R( fˆ ;x,y)<ε
]
= E
[
1 fˆ (x)=y, R( fˆ ;x, fˆ (x))<ε
]
≤ E
[
1R( fˆ ;x, fˆ (x))<ε
]
= E
[
1
Pδ( f (x+δ)= fˆ (x))<Φ( εσ )
]
, (6)
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Figure 1: Comparison of log-probabilty gap distributions under Gaussian noise sampled at a fixed test point
of MNIST. For each histogram, we used 10,000 samples of noise. The left, shaded area indicates where a
classifier makes a misclassification.
where the last equality is from the definition of R in (4). Therefore, we attempt to optimize the robust training
objective on fˆ via regularizing F(x + δ) to be consistent across δ. Specifically, we propose the following
consistency regularization upon any standard training objective:
Lcon := Eδ
[L(F(x + δ), Fˆ(x))] , (7)
where Fˆ(x) := E[F(x + δ)] is the mean prediction of F(x + δ), and L indicates the cross-entropy loss. In
other words, this regularization enforces F, correspondingly f as well, to reduce the variance of predictions
under Gaussian noise for a given sample x.
3.1 Comparison to prior works
There have been a few prior approaches in attempts to improve the robustness of smoothed classifiers with
a more sophisticated training method beyond that of Cohen et al. [2019]. Salman et al. [2019] proposed
SmoothAdv, which shows that adversarial training directly on smoothed classifiers improve the certified
robustness. More recently, Zhai et al. [2020] proposed a faster training method called MACER, via maximizing
a soft approximation of the certified radius given in (3).1 The essential difference of our regularization to the
previous works is at how the non-differentiable fˆ is handled, namely, prior works commonly approximate fˆ
directly by the inner soft-classifier F:
Eδ[1 f (x+δ)=k] ≈ Eδ[Fk(x + δ)], (8)
for each class k ∈ Y . A key caveat here is that, however, optimizing fˆ with this approximation would
implicitly count out much optimal solutions of F. More specifically, we remark that an optimal soft classifier
F does not require to have confidence near to 1 for maximizing the certified radius (3), which is a usual
solution found by minimizing the cross-entropy based on (8). Our approach rather considers an “indirect”
regularizer of fˆ without assuming such an approximation, thereby allows a more flexible optimization.
On the other hand, Li et al. [2019] proposed stability training, as a parallel attempt to the Gaussian training
of randomized smoothing [Cohen et al., 2019] to obtain a robust smoothed classifier: namely, in order to
perform well on Gaussian noise, stability training trains F with the following loss:
min
F
L(F(x), y) + λ · L(F(x), F(x + δ)), (9)
where L is the cross-entropy loss. The regularization term used in (9) has a seemingly similar formula to ours
(7), but there is a fundamental difference: our method (7) does not require F to jointly minimize L(F(x), y)
and L(F(x + δ), y) to perform well on (x + δ, y). Consequently, our method again allows a more flexible
solution compared to (9). In Section 4.3, we empirically show that our form of regularization (7) attains a
significantly better robustness than (9). We also show in Table 9 that, due to such flexibility, our method is
more robust on the choice of λ.
1For the interested readers, we present a more detailed overview of Salman et al. [2019] and Zhai et al. [2020] in Appendix C.
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In Figure 1, we illustrate how the optimal classifier found by our method differs from others, by comparing
the distribution of logits under Gaussian noise. Specifically, we compare the log-probability gap for a given
noisy sample (x + δ, y): log Fy(x + δ)−maxc 6=y log Fc(x + δ). We notice that our method learns relatively
lower, yet more consistent, confidences than others. We also found that MACER [Zhai et al., 2020] tends to
vary on much larger values in logits (see Figure 1(b)): MACER essentially maximizes the gap between the
first- and second-best logits of E[F(x + δ)], which leads F to have an arbitrary large value when optimized.
Finally, Figure 1(c) supports that our method is fundamentally different to the stability training [Li et al.,
2019]: one can observe that stability training does not give a particular consistency that our method shows.
3.2 Training with consistency regularization
Overall training objective. Combining our regularization Lcon to a natural surrogate loss Lnat leads to a
full objective to minimize. Any form of Lnat is possible to use, as long as it minimizes the natural error of fˆ
in (5), e.g., the standard cross-entropy loss on f may not be proper for Lnat. As a plain example, we use the
loss proposed by Cohen et al. [2019], which simply performs Gaussian augmentation during training: for a
given sample (x, y) ∼ D, the authors suggest to minimize:
Lnat := Eδ∼N (0,σ2 I) [L(F(x + δ), y)] . (10)
The overall objective with consistency regularization is then:
L := Lnat + λ · Lcon = Eδ
[L(F(x + δ), y) + λ · L(F(x + δ), Fˆ(x))] (11)
≈ 1
m ∑i
(L(F(x + δi), y) + λ · L(F(x + δi), Fˆ(x))) , (12)
where λ > 0 is a hyperparameter that controls the relative strength compared to Lnat, and (12) shows
a concrete training procedure with respect to (11) via Monte Carlo sampling over δ. Nevertheless, our
regularization scheme is not limited to a specific choice of Lnat, and one can also apply others in a similar
way. In our experiments, for example, we show that using SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019] as Lnat could
further improve the certified robustness, although it is significantly more expensive to optimize compared to
(10).
Computational overhead. We use m independent samples of Gaussian noise in (12) to estimate (11), and
this is the only source of extra training costs compared to the original [Cohen et al., 2019]. Nevertheless, we
empirically observe that the minimal choice of m = 2 is fairly enough for our method, as demonstrated in
Figure 4(b). Considering that other existing methods also use this inner-sampling procedure, often requiring
an additional outer-loop of backward computations for adversarial training [Salman et al., 2019], or a large
number of m for a stable training [Zhai et al., 2020], our method offers a significantly less training cost with
less hyperparameters, as further discussed in Section 4.5.
Other design choices. We also remark that one can adopt other forms of consistency regularization instead
of the cross-entropy loss L in (7) as well, as long as the regularization leads (6) to be zero. For example, in the
literature of semi-supervised learning, the mean-squared-error [Sajjadi et al., 2016] or KL-divergence [Miyato
et al., 2018] are commonly-used forms to enforce prediction consistency. In our experiments, we examine
both as well, and it turns out indeed they are also effective to improve the certified robustness. Nevertheless,
we empirically observe that our cross-entropy form (7) shows a particular robustness compared to them (see
Section 4.6 for more details).
4 Experiments
We validate the effectiveness of our proposed consistency regularization for a wide range of image classi-
fication datasets: MNIST [LeCun et al., 1998], CIFAR-10 [Krizhevsky, 2009], and ImageNet [Russakovsky
et al., 2015].2 Overall, our results consistently demonstrate that simply applying our method in addition
2Code is available at https://github.com/jh-jeong/smoothing-consistency.
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Figure 2: Comparison of approximate certified accuracy via randomized smoothing for various training
methods on MNIST. A sharp drop of certified accuracy in the plots exists since there is a hard upper bound
that CERTIFY can output for a given σ and n = 100, 000.
to the other baseline training methods greatly boosts the certified `2-robustness via randomized smooth-
ing. Remarkably, we show that our method even further improves the previous state-of-the-art results of
SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019]. We also perform an ablation study to further investigate the detailed
components proposed in our method.
4.1 Setups
Evaluation metrics. To evaluate certified robustness for a given classifier f , we aim to compute the certified
test accuracy at radius r, which is defined by the fraction of the test dataset that fˆ can certify the robustness of
radius r with respect to the certifiable lower bound in (3). Due to the intractability of this metric, however,
we instead measure the approximate certified test accuracy [Cohen et al., 2019]. More concretely, Cohen et al.
[2019] proposed a practical Monte Carlo based certification procedure, namely CERTIFY, which returns
the prediction of fˆ and a “safe” lower bound of certified radius over the randomness of n samples with
probability at least 1− α, or abstains the certification. The approximate certified test accuracy is then defined by
the fraction of the test dataset which CERTIFY classifies correctly with radius larger than r without abstaining.
In our experiments, we use the official implementation3 of CERTIFY for evaluation, with n = 100, 000,
n0 = 100 and α = 0.001, following the prior work [Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019]. We mainly report
the approximate certified test accuracy at various radii, but also report the average certified radius (ACR)
considered by Zhai et al. [2020], i.e., the averaged value of certified radii returned by CERTIFY, as another
metric for better comparison of robustness between two models under the trade-offs between accuracy and
robustness [Tsipras et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019]: namely, ACR := 1|Dtest| ∑(x,y)∈Dtest CR( f , σ, x) · 1 fˆ (x)=y,
where Dtest is the test dataset, and CR denotes the certified radius returned from CERTIFY( f , σ, x).
Training details. We use the same base classifier used in the prior work [Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al.,
2019; Zhai et al., 2020]: namely, we use LeNet [LeCun et al., 1998] for MNIST, ResNet-110 [He et al., 2016] for
CIFAR-10, and ResNet-50 [He et al., 2016] for ImageNet. For a fair comparison, we follow the same training
details used in Cohen et al. [2019] and Salman et al. [2019]. For each model configuration, we consider three
different models as varying the noise level σ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1.0}. During inference, we apply randomized
smoothing with the same σ used in the training. When our regularization is used, we use m = 2 unless
otherwise specified. More training details are specified in Appendix A.
Baseline methods. We evaluate how consistency regularization would affect the certified robustness when
applied to a baseline training method. In our experiments, we consider two baseline methods proposed for
training smoothed classifiers to apply our regularization scheme: (a) Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019]: training
with Gaussian augmentation over N (0, σ2 I); (b) SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019]: adversarial training on a
soft approximation of the smoothed classifier. We also consider stability training [Li et al., 2019] in (9) and
MACER [Zhai et al., 2020] to compare, as other regularization-based approaches.
3https://github.com/locuslab/smoothing
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Table 1: Comparison of approximate certified test accuracy on MNIST dataset. For each model, training and
certification are done with the same smoothing factor specified in σ. Each of the values indicates the fraction
of test samples those have `2 certified radius larger than the threshold specified at the top row. We set our
result bold-faced whenever the value improves the baseline. For ACR, we underlined the best-performing
model per each σ.
σ Models (MNIST) ACR 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50
0.25
Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019] 0.911 99.2 98.5 96.7 93.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
+ Consistency (λ = 20) 0.930 99.5 99.0 98.0 96.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019] 0.933 99.4 99.0 98.2 96.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
+ Consistency (λ = 5) 0.932 99.2 98.8 98.0 96.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Stability training [Li et al., 2019] 0.915 99.3 98.6 97.1 93.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MACER [Zhai et al., 2020] 0.920 99.3 98.7 97.5 94.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.50
Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019] 1.553 99.2 98.3 96.8 94.3 89.7 81.9 67.3 43.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
+ Consistency (λ = 20) 1.665 98.9 98.3 97.4 95.6 93.0 88.1 79.5 62.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019] 1.687 99.0 98.3 97.3 95.8 93.2 88.5 81.1 67.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
+ Consistency (λ = 5) 1.690 98.2 97.5 96.5 94.7 91.7 87.7 81.5 71.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Stability training [Li et al., 2019] 1.570 99.2 98.5 97.1 94.8 90.7 83.2 69.2 45.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
MACER [Zhai et al., 2020] 1.594 98.5 97.5 96.2 93.7 90.0 83.7 72.2 54.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.00
Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019] 1.620 96.4 94.4 91.4 87.0 79.9 71.0 59.6 46.2 32.6 19.7 10.8
+ Consistency (λ = 20) 1.750 92.5 89.8 86.5 81.7 76.3 69.6 61.4 52.9 44.2 35.9 26.8
SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019] 1.780 95.7 93.8 90.8 86.6 80.9 73.6 64.6 54.0 43.5 33.0 22.4
+ Consistency (λ = 5) 1.804 92.8 90.3 86.8 82.2 76.9 69.8 62.3 53.4 45.1 37.4 29.4
Stability training [Li et al., 2019] 1.634 96.5 94.6 91.7 87.4 80.6 72.0 60.5 46.8 33.1 20.0 11.2
MACER [Zhai et al., 2020] 1.570 92.0 88.5 84.0 78.1 71.5 63.8 55.3 46.3 36.5 26.2 16.3
4.2 Results on MNIST
We train every MNIST model for 90 epochs. We consider a fixed configuration of hyperparameters when
SmoothAdv is used in MNIST: specifically, we perform a 10-step projected gradient descent (PGD) attack
constrained in `2 ball of radius ε = 1.0 for each input, while the objective is approximated with m = 4 noise
samples. For the MACER models, on the other hand, we generally follow the hyperparameters specified in
the original paper [Zhai et al., 2020]: we set m = 16, λ = 16.0, γ = 8.0 and β = 16.0.4 In σ = 1.0, however,
we had to reduce λ to 6 for a successful training. Nevertheless, we have verified that the ACRs computed
from the reproduced models are comparable to those reported in the original paper. We use λ = 2 when
stability training [Li et al., 2019] is applied in this section.
We report the results in Table 1. We also plot full curves of certified accuracy over the full range of radii
per each σ in Figure 2. Overall, we observe that our consistency regularization stably improve Gaussian
and SmoothAdv baselines in ACR, except when applied to SmoothAdv on σ = 0.25. This corner-case
is possibly due to that the model is already achieve to the best capacity via SmoothAdv, regarding that
MNIST on σ = 0.25 is relatively a trivial task. For the rest non-trivial cases, nevertheless, our regularization
shows a remarkable effectiveness in two aspects: (a) applying our consistency regularization on Gaussian,
the simplest baseline, dramatically improves the certified test accuracy and ACR even outperforming the
recently proposed MACER by a large margin, and (b) when applied to SmoothAdv, our method could
further improve ACR. In particular, one could observe that our regularization significantly improves the
certified accuracy especially at large radii, where a classifier should attain a high value of p(1) (3), i.e., a
consistent prediction is required.
4We refer the readers to Zhai et al. [2020] for the details on each hyperparemeter.
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Figure 3: Comparison of approximate certified accuracy via randomized smoothing for various training
methods on CIFAR-10. A sharp drop of certified accuracy in the plots exists since there is a hard upper
bound that CERTIFY can output for a given σ and n = 100, 000.
4.3 Results on CIFAR-10
We train CIFAR-10 models for 150 epochs following the training details of SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019].
Whenever possible, we use the pre-trained models officially released by the authors for our evaluation
to reproduce the baseline results.567 For the SmoothAdv models, we report the results for two different
configurations: (a) for a fixed, pre-defined configuration across σ, and (b) for the “best” configuration per
each σ, which is heavily examined by Salman et al. [2019] over hundreds of models. In case of σ = 0.25,
however, we only report (b) as they show nearly identical results. For (a), we consider a 10-step PGD
attack constrained in `2 ball of radius ε = 1.0, using m = 8 noise samples.8 In case of stability training
[Li et al., 2019], we report the best models in terms of ACR across varying λ tested: namely, we consider
λ ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 20} for each σ, and report λ = 2 for σ = 0.25, 0.5 and λ = 1 for σ = 1.0. The full results can
be found in Table 9.
The results are presented in Table 2 and Figure 3. Our results in CIFAR-10 is even more significant than
MNIST, in terms of consistent improvement both in certified test accuracy and ACR. Specifically, when
σ = 0.50, we found our regularization with λ = 20 applied on the naïve Gaussian baseline could surpass
the best-performing SmoothAdv model reported in “SmoothAdv + Hyperparameter search”, in terms of
ACR. Furthermore, in case of σ = 1.00, consistency regularization upon the best SmoothAdv model even
further improve the current state-of-the-art baseline by a significant margin, which verifies an orthogonal
contribution of our method compared to the prior work. These observations suggest our method works
better on more complex tasks, where forcing “confident” prediction (as done in the prior works) might be
difficult. We also notice that, despite its similarity with our method, the stability training [Li et al., 2019]
itself does not improve ACRs even compared to the Gaussian baselines. This is because this training (9)
would require f to perform well both in x and x + δ, which is harder to force compared to that of (11) in the
context of randomized smoothing.
4.4 Results on ImageNet
We also evaluate our regularization scheme on ImageNet classification dataset, to show that our method
is scalable on large-scale datasets. We train each model on σ ∈ {0.5, 1.0} for 90 epochs. We perform our
evaluation on a subsampled test dataset of 500 samples as done by Cohen et al. [2019]. As presented in
Table 3, we observe that consistency regularization still effectively improves the certified robustness, both in
terms of ACR and certified test accuracy, despite its simple and efficient nature of our method. Compared to
5https://github.com/Hadisalman/smoothing-adversarial
6https://github.com/RuntianZ/macer
7In case of the pre-trained MACER models, we observe a slight discrepancy between our evaluation and those reported in Zhai et al.
[2020]. We have verified that this is due to a sampling bias: we found [Zhai et al., 2020] used 500 contiguous subsamples by default in
the official code, while our evaluation uses the full CIFAR-10 test set.
8The detailed configurations for (b), the best models, are specified in Appendix A.3.
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Table 2: Comparison of approximate certified test accuracy (%) on CIFAR-10 dataset. For each model,
training and certification are done with the same smoothing factor specified in σ. Each of the values indicates
the fraction of test samples those have `2 certified radius larger than the threshold specified at the top
row. We set our result bold-faced whenever the value improves the baseline. For ACR, we underlined the
best-performing model per each σ. For the results in “+ Hyperparameter search”, we evaluate the best model
among those released by Salman et al. [2019] trained for a given σ.
σ Models (CIFAR-10) ACR 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25
0.25
Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019] 0.424 76.6 61.2 42.2 25.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
+ Consistency (λ = 20) 0.551 75.9 67.5 57.6 46.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019] 0.544 73.4 65.6 57.0 47.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
+ Consistency (λ = 5) 0.555 73.3 66.3 57.7 49.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Stability training [Li et al., 2019] 0.421 72.3 58.0 43.3 27.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MACER [Zhai et al., 2020] 0.531 79.5 69.0 55.8 40.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.50
Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019] 0.525 65.7 54.9 42.8 32.5 22.0 14.1 8.3 3.9 0.0 0.0
+ Consistency (λ = 10) 0.725 64.8 58.2 50.9 43.8 36.4 29.4 22.8 16.1 0.0 0.0
+ Consistency (λ = 20) 0.737 59.0 53.9 48.7 43.4 37.8 32.7 27.0 21.0 0.0 0.0
SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019] 0.689 64.4 57.2 49.0 40.6 33.6 27.4 21.8 14.0 0.0 0.0
+ Hyperparameter search 0.717 53.1 49.2 44.9 41.0 37.2 33.2 29.1 24.0 0.0 0.0
+ Consistency (λ = 5) 0.716 52.7 48.8 44.6 41.1 37.5 33.3 28.8 24.3 0.0 0.0
Stability training [Li et al., 2019] 0.521 60.6 51.5 41.4 32.5 23.9 15.3 9.6 5.0 0.0 0.0
MACER [Zhai et al., 2020] 0.691 64.2 57.5 49.9 42.3 34.8 27.6 20.2 12.6 0.0 0.0
1.00
Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019] 0.542 47.2 39.2 34.0 27.8 21.6 17.4 14.0 11.8 10.0 7.6
+ Consistency (λ = 10) 0.727 47.1 42.7 38.1 33.5 29.2 25.3 21.9 18.4 15.6 12.4
+ Consistency (λ = 20) 0.742 43.8 40.1 36.0 32.3 28.4 25.0 21.7 18.9 16.3 13.8
SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019] 0.682 50.2 44.0 37.6 33.8 28.8 24.0 20.2 15.8 13.2 10.2
+ Hyperparameter search 0.785 45.6 41.9 38.0 34.2 30.9 27.4 24.1 20.7 17.7 14.9
+ Consistency (λ = 2) 0.799 45.2 41.9 38.1 34.6 31.1 27.9 24.3 21.1 18.4 15.5
Stability training [Li et al., 2019] 0.526 43.5 38.9 32.8 27.0 23.1 19.1 15.4 11.3 7.8 5.7
MACER [Zhai et al., 2020] 0.744 41.4 38.5 35.2 32.3 29.3 26.4 23.4 20.2 17.4 14.5
the best results of SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019], our results achieve a comparable robustness, despite
using a single fixed configuration of hyperparameter, namely λ = 10.
4.5 Runtime analysis
Table 4: Comparison of training time statistics on
CIFAR-10 with σ = 0.50. All the baselines are
trained on their official implementations separately.
Models # HP ACR Mem. Time (h)
Gaussian 0.525 2.9G 4.6
+ Consistency 2 0.737 2.9G 8.7
SmoothAdv 3 0.716 3.0G 23.1
MACER 4 0.691 9.4G 14.1
With much effectiveness on the certified robustness,
consistency regularization also offers a great efficiency
in terms of training costs compared to other competitive
methods. We compare our method with the baselines
in several training statistics, including the number of
hyper-parameter (# HP), ACR, memory usage in GPU
on peak computation (Mem.), and the total training
time (Time). In this experiment, every model is trained
on CIFAR-10 using one GPU of NVIDIA TITAN X (Pas-
cal). We use σ = 0.5 with hyperparameters specified in
Section 4.3. In case of SmoothAdv, we choose the best-performing configuration for training. Our method to
compare runs upon the Gaussian baseline with m = 2 and λ = 20.
The results summarized in the Table 4 show that our regularization indeed costs about twice the Gaussian
baseline due to additional sampling procedure, but one can immediately notice that this overhead is far less
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Table 3: Comparison of approximate certified test accuracy (%) on ImageNet dataset. For each model,
training and certification are done with the same smoothing factor specified in σ. Each of the values indicates
the fraction of test samples those have `2 certified radius larger than the threshold specified at the top row.
We set our result bold-faced whenever the value improves the baseline.
σ Models (ImageNet) ACR 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
0.50
Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019] 0.733 57 46 37 29 0 0 0 0
+ Consistency (λ = 10) 0.809 54 48 41 37 0 0 0 0
SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019] 0.825 54 49 43 37 0 0 0 0
1.00
Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019] 0.875 44 38 33 26 19 15 12 9
+ Consistency (λ = 10) 1.008 41 37 34 30 25 22 18 14
SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019] 1.040 40 37 34 30 27 25 20 15
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(c) Effect of λ
Figure 4: Comparison of approximate certified accuracy via randomized smoothing across various types of
ablation models. A sharp drop of certified accuracy in the plots exists since there is a hard upper bound that
CERTIFY can output for a given σ and n = 100, 000.
than other baselines, e.g., compared to adversarial training. Furthermore, our method even achieves better
ACR than other methods, which verifies a clear efficiency of consistency regularization compared to the
prior work.
4.6 Ablation study
We conduct an ablation study for a detailed analysis on the proposed method. All the experiments in this
section are performed on MNIST. When consistency regularization is used, we assume it is applied upon
Gaussian training. We report all the detailed results in Appendix B.
Design choices on loss. In order to enforce the prediction consistency, our regularization uses cross-entropy
loss between individual prediction and their mean (7). Here, we examine two other popular designs for
consistency regularization, namely, mean-squared-error [Sajjadi et al., 2016] and KL-divergence [Miyato
et al., 2018] by considering the following alternative forms:
LMSE := ||F(x + δ1)− F(x + δ2)||22 and LKL := KL(Fˆ(x) || F(x + δ)), (13)
where δ1, δ2 ∼ N (0, σ2 I). We evaluate certified test accuracy on σ = 1.00 for these regularization with
varying λ ∈ {20, 50, 100}, and compare the results with Lcon with λ = 20. The results are presented in
Figure 4(a). In general, we observe that both regularizers, namely LMSE and LKL, are also capable to improve
the certified robustness, but they could not achieve a better ACR than Lcon even with a moderately large λ.
This observation indicates the importance of regularizing the entropy of the mean prediction, once noticing
that Lcon = LKL + H(Fˆ(x)) where H denotes the entropy. Indeed, we empirically observe that both LMSE
and LKL often lead the predictions to be too close to the uniform when λ is large, which may harm the
discriminative performance of the base classifier.
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Effect of m. As mentioned in Section 3, the computational costs for our regularization scheme highly de-
pends on the number of noise samples used, namely m > 1. Nevertheless, we observe that our regularization
is fairly robust on the choice of m, so that m = 2 usually leads to good enough performance. In Figure 4(b),
we compare the certified robustness of models trained with our regularization with varying m ∈ {2, 4, 8}.
For each m, we present three different models under various σ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1.0}. The results show that
models using m = 2 perform nearly identically to others, while one could observe a slight improvement at
σ = 1.0 for larger m. In practice, this observation reduces much of the hyperparameter complexity in our
method: by simply letting m to be small, e.g., m = 2, λ becomes the only crucial hyperparameter.
Effect of λ. We also investigate the effect of having different λ in Figure 4(c). As expected, we observe a
clear trade-off between accuracy and robustness of the corresponding smoothed classifier by controlling λ.
Furthermore, for a sufficiently large λ, e.g., λ = 40 in Figure 4(c), a classifier is often trained to return maximal
certifiable radius for any input when smoothed, even the accuracy falls into chance-level. Nevertheless, this
would be a desirable property for a trade-off term between accuracy and robustness, which has not been
explored much for smoothed classifiers.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show consistency regularization can play a key role in certifiable robustness of smoothed
classifiers. We think our work would emphasize the importance of noise-consistent inference in deep neural
networks, one of under-explored topics despite its desirable property. We also expect our work can be a
useful guideline when other researchers will study the noise-consistency in other problems in the future.
Many questions are related: how can we design a “noise-invariant” neural network, or for which family of
noise this would be allowed, just to name a few.
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A Details on experimental setups
A.1 Training details
We train every model via stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with Nesterov momentum of weight 0.9 without
dampening. We set a weight decay of 10−4 for all the models. We use different training schedules for each
dataset: (a) MNIST: The initial learning rate is set to 0.01; We train a model for 90 epochs with mini-batch
size 256, and the learning rate is decayed by 0.1 at 30-th and 60-th epoch, (b) CIFAR-10: The initial learning
rate is set to 0.1; We train a model for 150 epochs with mini-batch size 256, and the learning rate is decayed
by 0.1 at 50-th and 100-th epoch, and (c) ImageNet: The initial learning rate is set to 0.1; We train a model for
90 epochs with mini-batch size 200, and the learning rate is decayed by 0.1 at 30-th and 60-th epoch. When
SmoothAdv is used, we adopt the warm-up strategy on attack radius ε [Salman et al., 2019], i.e., ε is initially
set to zero, and linearly increased during the first 10 epochs to a pre-defined hyperparameter.
A.2 Datasets
MNIST dataset [LeCun et al., 1998] consists 70,000 gray-scale hand-written digit images of size 28×28,
60,000 for training and 10,000 for testing. Each of the images is labeled from 0 to 9, i.e., there are 10 classes.
When training on MNIST, we do not perform any pre-processing except for normalizing the range of each
pixel from 0-255 to 0-1. The full dataset can be downloaded at http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/.
CIFAR-10 dataset [Krizhevsky, 2009] consist of 60,000 RGB images of size 32×32 pixels, 50,000 for training
and 10,000 for testing. Each of the images is labeled to one of 10 classes, and the number of data per class is
set evenly, i.e., 6,000 images per each class. We follow the same data-augmentation scheme used in Cohen
et al. [2019]; Salman et al. [2019] for a fair comparison, namely, we use random horizontal flip and random
translation up to 4 pixels. We also normalize the images in pixel-wise by the mean and the standard deviation
calculated from the training set. Here, an important practical point is that this normalization is done after a
noise is added to input when regarding randomized smoothing, following Cohen et al. [2019]. This is to
ensure that noise is given to the original image coordinates. In practical implementations, this can be done
by placing the normalization as the first layer of base classifiers, instead of as a pre-processing step. The full
dataset can be downloaded at https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/cifar.html
ImageNet classification dataset [Russakovsky et al., 2015] consists of 1.2 million training images and 50,000
validation images, which are labeled by one of 1,000 classes. For data-augmentation, we perform 224×224
random cropping with random resizing and horizontal flipping to the training images. At test time, on
the other hand, 224×224 center cropping is performed after re-scaling the images into 256×256. This pre-
processing scheme is also used in Cohen et al. [2019]; Salman et al. [2019] as well. Similar to CIFAR-10, all the
images are normalized after adding a noise in pixel-wise by the pre-computed mean and standard deviation.
A link for downloading the full dataset can be found in http://image-net.org/download.
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Table 5: Detailed specification of hyperparameters used in the best-performing SmoothAdv models.
Dataset σ Method # steps ε m
CIFAR-10
0.25 PGD 10 255 4
0.50 PGD 10 512 2
1.00 PGD 10 512 2
ImageNet 0.50 PGD 1 255 11.00 PGD 1 512 1
A.3 Detailed configurations of SmoothAdv models
In Table 5, we specify the exact configurations used in our evaluation for the best-performing SmoothAdv
models. These configurations have originally explored by Salman et al. [2019] via a grid search over 4 hyper-
parameters: namely, (a) attack method (Method): PGD [Madry et al., 2018] or DDN [Rony et al., 2019], (b)
the number of steps (# steps), (c) the maximum allowed `2 perturbation on the input (ε), and (d) the number
of noise samples (m). We choose one pre-trained model per σ for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, among those
officially released and classified as the best-performing models by Salman et al. [2019]. The link to download
all the pre-trained models can be found in https://github.com/Hadisalman/smoothing-adversarial.
B Detailed results in ablation study
We report the detailed results for the experiments performed in ablation study (see Section 4.6). Table 6, 7,
and 8 are corresponded to Figure 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c), respectively.
Table 6: Comparison of approximate certified test accuracy (%) on MNIST, for varing loss functions and
λ. We set our result bold-faced whenever the value improves the baseline. For ACR, we underlined the
best-performing model.
Model λ ACR 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50
Gaussian 0 1.620 96.4 94.4 91.4 87.0 79.9 71.0 59.6 46.2 32.6 19.7 10.8
MSE
20 1.677 93.6 91.0 87.5 83.0 77.1 69.9 60.8 50.3 39.5 28.6 18.4
50 1.603 92.5 90.0 86.1 81.3 75.5 67.7 58.6 47.4 35.7 24.1 14.5
100 1.570 91.5 88.8 84.7 80.0 73.8 65.9 57.0 46.5 34.6 23.5 14.3
KL-divergence
20 1.713 94.0 91.7 88.2 83.5 77.7 70.5 61.5 51.4 41.2 31.1 21.4
50 1.707 93.4 90.7 87.1 82.3 76.8 69.4 60.6 50.9 41.3 31.8 22.6
100 1.683 92.7 89.9 85.9 81.3 75.4 68.0 59.5 49.9 40.4 31.2 22.6
Cross-entropy 20 1.750 92.5 89.8 86.5 81.7 76.3 69.6 61.4 52.9 44.2 35.9 26.8
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Table 7: Comparison of approximate certified test accuracy on MNIST for varying m ∈ {2, 4, 8}. For each
model, training and certification are done with the same smoothing factor specified in σ.
σ m ACR 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50
0.25
2 0.930 99.5 99.0 98.0 96.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 0.931 99.5 99.0 98.2 96.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8 0.931 99.4 98.9 98.2 96.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.50
2 1.665 98.9 98.3 97.4 95.6 93.0 88.1 79.5 62.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 1.672 99.0 98.3 97.4 95.6 93.2 88.7 80.0 63.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
8 1.670 98.9 98.4 97.4 95.8 93.2 88.7 79.9 63.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.00
2 1.750 92.5 89.8 86.5 81.7 76.3 69.6 61.4 52.9 44.2 35.9 26.8
4 1.762 92.2 89.4 86.3 81.5 76.0 69.3 61.2 52.6 44.2 36.9 28.1
8 1.771 91.9 89.0 85.9 81.5 76.1 69.2 61.4 52.8 44.9 37.2 29.0
Table 8: Comparison of approximate certified test accuracy on MNIST for varying λ. We set our result
bold-faced whenever the value improves the baseline (λ = 0.0). For ACR, we underlined the best-performing
model.
λ ACR 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50
0.0 1.620 96.4 94.4 91.4 87.0 79.9 71.0 59.6 46.2 32.6 19.7 10.8
1.0 1.707 96.0 94.1 91.3 86.9 81.0 73.0 63.1 51.2 38.7 26.8 15.5
5.0 1.741 95.0 92.9 89.8 85.4 79.5 72.6 63.3 52.8 41.8 31.0 20.6
10.0 1.743 94.2 92.0 88.8 84.3 78.7 71.7 62.9 52.8 42.7 32.3 22.7
15.0 1.749 93.7 91.2 87.8 83.2 77.6 70.6 62.2 52.8 43.7 34.1 24.7
20.0 1.750 92.5 89.8 86.5 81.7 76.3 69.6 61.4 52.9 44.2 35.9 26.8
25.0 1.737 90.5 88.0 84.3 79.7 74.4 67.6 60.6 52.6 44.8 37.3 28.2
30.0 1.713 87.4 84.6 81.0 76.5 71.4 65.5 59.1 52.4 45.6 38.3 29.9
35.0 1.654 81.6 78.8 75.7 71.3 66.7 62.0 56.6 51.4 45.3 39.0 31.4
40.0 0.432 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3
Table 9: Comparison of our method to stability training [Li et al., 2019] on CIFAR-10 dataset. Each of the
values indicates the fraction of test samples those have `2 certified radius larger than the threshold specified
at the top row. We set our result bold-faced whenever the value improves the baseline.
σ Models (CIFAR-10) ACR 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25
0.25
Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019] 0.424 76.6 61.2 42.2 25.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
+ Consistency (λ = 20) 0.551 75.9 67.5 57.6 46.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Stability [Li et al., 2019] (λ = 1) 0.408 71.6 57.8 40.7 27.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Stability [Li et al., 2019] (λ = 2) 0.421 72.3 58.0 43.3 27.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Stability [Li et al., 2019] (λ = 5, 10, 20) 0.102 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.50
Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019] 0.525 65.7 54.9 42.8 32.5 22.0 14.1 8.3 3.9 0.0 0.0
+ Consistency (λ = 20) 0.737 59.0 53.9 48.7 43.4 37.8 32.7 27.0 21.0 0.0 0.0
Stability [Li et al., 2019] (λ = 1) 0.496 61.1 51.5 40.9 29.8 21.1 14.0 8.3 3.6 0.0 0.0
Stability [Li et al., 2019] (λ = 2) 0.521 60.6 51.5 41.4 32.5 23.9 15.3 9.6 5.0 0.0 0.0
Stability [Li et al., 2019] (λ = 5, 10, 20) 0.206 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 0.0 0.0
1.00
Gaussian [Cohen et al., 2019] 0.542 47.2 39.2 34.0 27.8 21.6 17.4 14.0 11.8 10.0 7.6
+ Consistency (λ = 20) 0.742 43.8 40.1 36.0 32.3 28.4 25.0 21.7 18.9 16.3 13.8
Stability [Li et al., 2019] (λ = 1) 0.526 43.5 38.9 32.8 27.0 23.1 19.1 15.4 11.3 7.8 5.7
Stability [Li et al., 2019] (λ = 2) 0.414 17.0 16.3 15.4 14.6 13.7 12.6 12.1 11.2 10.3 9.8
Stability [Li et al., 2019] (λ = 5, 10, 20) 0.381 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
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C Overview on prior works
For completeness, we present a brief introduction to the prior works mainly considered in our experiments.
We use the notations defined in Section 2 throughout this appendix.
C.1 SmoothAdv
Recall (2) that a smoothed classifier fˆ is defined from a hard classifier f : Rd → Y . Here, SmoothAdv [Salman
et al., 2019] attempts to perform adversarial training [Madry et al., 2018] directly on fˆ :
min
fˆ
max
||x′−x||2≤e
L( fˆ ; x′, y), (14)
where L denotes the standard cross-entropy loss. As mentioned in Section 3, however, fˆ is practically a
non-differentiable object when (2) is approximated via Monte Carlo sampling, making it difficult to optimize
the inner maximization of (14). To bypass this, Salman et al. [2019] propose to attack the soft-smoothed
classifier Fˆ := Eδ[Fy(x + δ)] instead of fˆ , as Fˆ : Rd → ∆K−1 is rather differentiable. Namely, SmoothAdv
finds an adversarial example via solving the following:
xˆ = arg max
||x′−x||2≤e
L(Fˆ; x′, y) = arg max
||x′−x||2≤e
(− logEδ [Fy(x′ + δ)]) . (15)
In practice, the expectation in this objective (15) is approximated via Monte Carlo integration with m samples
of δ, namely δ1, · · · , δm ∼ N (0, σ2 I):
xˆ = arg max
||x′−x||2≤e
(
− log
(
1
m ∑i
Fy(x′ + δi)
))
. (16)
To optimize the outer minimization objective in (14), on the other hand, SmoothAdv simply minimize the
averaged loss over (xˆ + δ1, y), · · · , (xˆ + δm, y), i.e., minF 1m ∑i L(F; xˆ + δi, y). Notice that the noise samples
δ1, · · · , δm are re-used for the outer minimization as well.
C.2 MACER
On the other hand, MACER [Zhai et al., 2020] attempts to improve robustness of fˆ via directly maximizing
the certified lower bound (3) on `2-adversarial perturbations [Cohen et al., 2019] for (x, y) ∈ D. Again,
directly maximizing (3) is difficult due to the non-differentiability of fˆ , thereby MACER instead maximizes
the certified radius of Fˆ, in a similar manner to SmoothAdv [Salman et al., 2019]:
CR(Fˆ; x, y) :=
σ
2
(
Φ−1(Eδ[Fy(x + δ)])−Φ−1(max
c 6=y
Eδ[Fc(x + δ)])
)
. (17)
Motivated from the 0-1 robust classification loss (18) in the following, Zhai et al. [2020] propose a robust
training objective for maximizing CR(Fˆ; x, y) along with the standard cross-entropy loss L on Fˆ as a surrogate
loss for the natural error term:
Lε( f ) := E(x,y)∈D
[
1− 1CR( fˆ ;x,y)≥ε
]
= E
[
1 fˆ (x) 6=y
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
natural error
+E
[
1 fˆ (x)=y, CR( fˆ ;x,y)<ε
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
robust error
(18)
LMACER(F; x, y) := L(Fˆ(x), y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
natural error
+ λ · σ
2
max{γ−CR(Fˆ; x, y), 0} · 1Fˆ(x)=y︸ ︷︷ ︸
robust error
, (19)
where γ, λ are hyperparameters. Here, notice that (19) uses the hinge loss to maximize CR(Fˆ; x, y), only for
the samples that Fˆ(x) is correctly classified to y. In addition, MACER uses an inverse temperature β > 1 to
calibrate Fˆ as another hyperparameter, mainly for reducing the practical gap between Fˆ and fˆ .
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